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THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT: IMPLIED WAIVER OF
STATE IMMUNITY RE-EXAMINED
Williamson Towing Co. v. Illinois,
534 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1976)
The eleventh amendment' grants the states immunity from any suit
brought by private citizens in federal courts for money damages. 2 The leading
United States Supreme Court cases have carved out the exception that
Congress may enact statutes which condition the state's participation under a
federally regulated program on a waiver of such state immunity. 3 Within this
exception, however, a significant controversy exists as to whether the waiver
of such state immunity must be express or whether it can be implied under the,
federal statute in question.
The dispute over implied waiver involves balancing vital state interests
against the rights of the individual. The courts which are more conservative
on this issue assert that the social benefits of preserving taxpayer revenues for
the exclusive use of providing statewide governmental services outweighs the
costs of making these funds available to pay money damages sustained by
certain citizens due to the negligence of a government employee. In addition,
these courts believe that constitutional amendments should not be waived
merely by inference. For these reasons, the conservative courts advocate
waiver only by strict statutory construction. The more liberal courts have
grown intolerant of the manner in which this amendment has placed the states
above the law. As a result, they have developed theories wherein a waiver
could be implied based on a court's conception of the paramount purposes or
federal policy objectives behind the statute in question.
This article will examine the test advanced by the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in Williamson Towing Co. v. Illinois4 for construing a
statutory waiver of the eleventh amendment. The court's test requires a
showing of express statutory language which "provided that the [statute's]
private remedy is applicable to the States.'5 An analysis of this test will
1. The eleventh amendment specifies that: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign States."
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
2. In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the Supreme Court held that a state's immunity
applied to such suits brought by its own citizens.
3. See notes 31-89 and accompanying text infra.
4. 534 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1976).
5. Id. at 762, (quoting from Intracoastal Transp., Inc. v. Decatur County, 482 F.2d 361,
365 (5th Cir. 1973)).
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conclude that it is adequate to deal with only those statutes involving the issue
of waiver which are already clear on their face. As a result, its test is
inadequate to aid the courts in handling those federal statutes which expressly
provide for private actions against a class of defendants but remain unclear as
to whether Congress intended that the states be included as a member of that
class. To this end it will be shown that the Court has set forth some general
principles as guidelines for resolving such statutory dilemmas and that the
Seventh Circuit may have failed to fully incorporate those principles in its
test.
This article will further propose an alternative test which would deal
more effectively with this statutory problem. In relevant part, the proposed
test would require a showing of statutory language from which it could be
reasonably inferred that the states could have been included as party of the
statute's defendant-class. If, and only if, this premise is established, the court
would then be justified in considering whether certain specified policy
conditions exist which further warrant the conclusion that the statute provides
for a waiver. This article will conclude that the proposed test more fully
encompasses the Supreme Court's rulings than the Seventh Circuit's test
does.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The issue of sovereign immunity was the subject of significant debate
during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution.6 At the heart of this
debate was the issue of whether article III, section 2,7 provided that the federal
judiciary could subject a state to its jurisdiction as a defendant and subse-
quently "adjudicate its rights and liabilities." 8 Proponents of article III were
able to persuade delegates at both the Constitutional Convention and the
various state ratification conventions that state sovereign immunity would
survive under article III, section 2. 9 However, opponents argued that a literal
6. 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 91 (1922) [hereinafter
cited as WARREN].
7. This jurisdictional article, in pertinent part, reads: "The judicial Power shall extend to
all Cases In Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United
States . . . to Controversies between . . . a State and Citizens of another State. U.S.
CONST., art. III, § 2.
8. WARREN, supra note 6, at 91.
9. Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 5 HOUSTON L. REV. 1, 7 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Cullison].
The argument advanced by those interpreting the Constitution as a bulwark of state
immunity is summed up in this excerpt from THE FEDERALIST No. 81, written by Alexander
Hamilton:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent . . . . [T]here is no color to pretend that the State governments
would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own
debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the
obligations of good faith. . . . [T]o ascribe to the federal courts, by mere implication,
and in destruction of a pre-existing right of the State governments, a power which
would involve such a consequence, would be altogether forced and unwarrantable.
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, 487-88 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis added).
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interpretation of article III, section 2 would permit federal courts to decide
suits for money damages against a state by a nonresident. 10 In addition, they
predicted that "if the purpose of these provisions . . . were to assure
evenhandedness to foreigners, maybe their effect would be to permit such
suits by foreigners . . . since the state could sue them in the federal
courts."1" By the time the Constitution had been ratified, however, most
Americans were convinced that article III simply provided that the federal
courts would serve as an impartial forum in suits involving diversity of
citizenship. Popular opinion maintained that it stopped short of allowing
private suits for money damages against the states.12
It was no surprise, however, when shortly after Congress approved the
first panel of United States Supreme Court Justices, the new Court was
confronted with the issue of whether the federal courts had jurisdiction over
private actions against the states.' 3 The Court attempted to resolve the
question in Chisholm v. Georgia, 4 which involved an action brought by a
foreigner to recover payment for supplies purchased by the State of Georgia
during the Revolutionary period. By a vote of four to one, the Court boldly
rejected Georgia's defense of sovereign immunity and decided that the
Constitution empowered federal courts with jurisdiction over suits against the
states by either foreigners or citizens of another state. "
10. Cullison, supra note 9, at 7.
11. Id. at 7.
12. Id. at 7; See also WARREN, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 83 (1923).
13. Vanstophorst v. Maryland, Oswald v. New York, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 401 (1791)(notations
of motions). See also Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1430 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Nowak].
14. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
15. Nowak, supra note 13, at 1431-32 n.109, summarizes by stating:
The Chief Justice, after stating that the feudal notion of complete sovereignty was
inconsistent with democracy, found that suits against states were not incompatible
with their limited sovereignty. Relying on this theory of the proper role of sovereignty
in a democracy, he determined that the Constitution authorized the federal courts to
assume jurisdiction over suits against states. He found that the unequal treatment by
individual states of citizens of other states and countries was 'among the evils against
which it was proper for the nation, that is the people of all the United States, to provide
by a national judiciary.' Without referring to the history of Article III, he found that his
position must be the natural implication of the Article's language. Thus he concluded:
'This extension of power is remedial, because it is to settle controversies. It is,
therefore, to be construed liberally. It is politic, wise, and good, that, not only the
controversies in which a state is plaintiff, but also those in which a state is defendant,
should be settled. . . .If the constitution really meant to extend these powers only to
those controversies in which a state might be plaintiff, to the exclusion of those in
which citizens had demands against a state, it is inconceivable, that it should have
attempted to convey that meaning in words, not only so incompetent, but also so
repugnant to it . . . . (citations omitted.)
Nowak points out that while none of the five justices in Chisholm found that Congress had
empowered the Court to decide this action against Georgia, Justice Iredell, in his dissenting
opinion, concluded that the federal courts were enjoined from exercising this jurisdiction in the
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The nationwide reaction to the outcome of the Chisholm case was
extremely negative. 16 A resolution creating a new constitutional amendment
to protect the states' sovereign immunity was introduced in Congress the day
after the Court's ruling.' 7 One year later, on March 4, 1793, Congress
approved the final draft of the eleventh amendment by a vote of 81 to 9.18
There is still a considerable amount of controversy regarding the
political machinations which led to the swift passage of the eleventh amend-
ment.19 Support for the eleventh amendment was justified primarily on the
two following policy arguments. First, supporters of sovereign immunity
feared that the Court's interpretation of article Hm in Chisholm would result in
a substantial fiscal drain on state treasuries. 2" Specifically, it was felt that
Chisholm permitted federal courts to require the states to pay debts owed by
state legislatures to citizens of other states or foreign countries, especially
those owed to refugees, Tories and British creditors. 2 This was particularly
worrisome at a time when the possibility of another war With Great Britain
appeared imminent.22 Second, states' rights activists feared that Chisholm
would upset the delicate federal-state balance by enabling the judiciary to
assume the legislative power of granting itself jurisdiction over such private
suits against the states. 23 They felt that the responsibility for balancing vital
state interests against the waiver of state immunity should not be vested in the
judicial branch.24
absence of Congressional authorization. Nowak, supra note 13, at 1432; See Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 432-33. In doing so, he rejected the majority's theory that "the Court
had inherent jurisdiction to decide such cases under Article III." Nowak, supra note 13, at 1432;
See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 436-37.
16. An editorial appearing in a Federalist newspaper in Massachusetts characterized the
overall reaction in the following way: "[Tihe decision has excited great apprehension in some
. . . .Many pieces have already appeared in the public papers on the subject, some of which at
least are expressed more to the passions than to the reason." Salem Gazette, July 23, 1793,
quoted in WARREN, supra note 6, at 98.
Typical of the widespread emotional reaction to Chisholm was this editorial:
It must excite serious ideas in those who have from the beginning been inclined to
suspect that the absorption of the State governments has long been a matter deter-
mined on by certain influential characters in this country who are aiming gradually at
monarchy. Federal jurisprudence has aimed a blow at the sovereignty of the individual
States, and the late decision of the Supreme tribunal of the Union has placed the
ridgepole on the wide-extended fabrick of consolidation. The representatives of the
free citizens of the independent States will, no doubt, cherish the spirit of investigation
and remonstrate on this subject with wisdom and firmness.
National Gazette, June 1, 1793; Boston Gazette, Aug. 5, 1793, quoted in WARREN, supra note 6,
at 97-98.
17. For a discussion and analysis of these resolutions and passage of the eleventh
amendment, see Nowak, supra note 13, at 1433-41.
18. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 651-52 (1793).
19. WARREN, supra note 6, at 91-105; contra, C. Jacobs, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
SOVEREIGNTY IMMUNITY 21-22 (1972).
20. Cullison, supra note 9, at 7.
21. Nowak, supra note 13, at 1437-38.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1440.
24. Although the framers believed that the satisfaction of public debts was a sacred
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Fear of both the legislative power to create and the judicial power to
imply a private cause against a state seems to indicate that the drafters of the
eleventh amendment intended to completely eliminate the possibility of a
private suit being brought against the states. This inference, however, is
incorrect. The ratification debates do not show that the drafters sought to
reaffirm the prior interpretation of article III as preventing citizens from suing
states in federal courts. Their intent was simply to limit the power of the
judiciary "to construe" federal jurisdiction over the states in such cases. 25 In
doing so, the Second and Third Congresses resolved the Chisholm controver-
sy via the eleventh amendment and thereby implicitly vested the power of
determining such federal court jurisdiction in the legislative branch of
government 26
Close examination of the eleventh amendment reveals that in light of its
historical development, it should not be interpreted in a literal sense. 27 For
this reason, most judges 28 and commentators 29 have urged the courts to
interpret this amendment in accordance with the drafters' intent and not in a
dogmatic obeisance to the letter of the law. As Chief Justice Hughes said in
Monaco v. Mississippi:
Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the
words of § 2 of Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh
Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-
consenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provi-
sions are postulates which limit and control.30
Thus, the task of deciphering the postulates behind the literal text was
imposed upon the courts.
obligation, they also believed that this state obligation should be exercised through good faith and
not through the federal court system. See note 7 and quote by A. Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST
No. 81.
25. Nowak, supra note 13, at 1440.
26. Id. at 1441-42. By choosing Congress as the lesser of two evils to determine such federal
jurisdiction over the states, the drafters recognized that:
Congress is the only governmental entity which shares a dual responsibility to the state
and federal systems and is accountable at both levels. The federal judiciary, on the
other hand, is insulated from the influence of the states. Neither the federal nor state
government has any practical recourse from an adverse ruling by the Court limiting or
expanding congressional power and affecting the delicate balance between federal and
state powers. There is then a real danger that judicial precedents will erect rigid
principles of federalism ill-suited to a changing society. The early Court opinions
dealing with the Commerce Clause, for example, demonstrate the danger of judicial
assumption of ultimate responsibility for determining the parameters of federal power
in relation to state sovereignty.
Id. (Footnotes deleted.) See also Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543,
558-59 (1954).
27. Cullison, supra note 9, at 16.
28. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
29. Cullison, supra note 9, at 17.
30. 292 U.S. at 322.
480 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
THE SUPREME COURT CASES
Prior to the 1950s the Supreme Court exercised restraint in keeping with
the drafters' intent that the eleventh amendment serve as a limitation on the
judiciary's power to construe a waiver of state sovereignty. Specifically, the
Court embraced two general postulates. First, the Court adhered to the
postulate that the authority to enact statutes which waived state immunity
should be vested in the state legislatures, not the Congress of the United
States. 3 1 Second, the Court postulated a theory for the statutory construction
of such waivers in Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co. 32 In that case, the Court
held that a statutory interpretation of waiver was justified only "if exacted by
the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text
as would leave no room for any other reasonable construction. "
33
After 1955, the Warren Court endeavored to step beyond the historical
boundaries of its power as limited by the pre-1950 postulates. Specifically,
the Court attempted to expand its role in determining when federal jurisdic-
tion exists over the states by involving itself in the controversy over what
constituted a statutory waiver of their sovereign immunity. In doing so, it
became apparent that the Court considered the pre-1950 postulates as any-
thing but axiomatic.
The first case to transcend these postulates was Petty v. Tennessee-
Missouri Bridge Commission.34 That case involved a "sue-and-be-sued"
clause contained in an interstate compact between Tennessee
35 and Missouri 36
which created a bi-state commission to build and operate a bridge across the
Mississippi River. Subsequently, the plaintiff's decedent brought a wrongful
death action against the bi-state commission under the Jones Act. 37 In
rejecting the states' eleventh amendment defense of immunity, the Warren
Court declared for the first time that this question should be resolved by
"federal not state law. "38 This ruling completely contradicted the pre-1950
postulate which extended the power of waiver to state legislatures and not the
United States Congress. Justice Douglas reasoned that since Congress was
required to approve this interstate compact (containing a "sue-and-be-sued"
clause) pursuant to the compact clause of the Constitution, 39 both states
"clearly consented" to such private suits in federal courts.' Specifically, the
31. Cullison, supra note 9, at 30.
32. 213 U.S. 151 (1909).
33. 213 U.S. at 171 [hereinafter cited as the Murray Postulate].
34. 359 U.S. 275 (1955).
35. 1949 Tenn. Pub. Acts, chs. 167-168.
36. 1949 Mo. Legis. Serv. (Vernon), tit. 14, § 234.60.
37. 359 U.S. at 278.
38. Id. at 280.
39. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress.
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State .... "
40. Congress gave its consent in the Act of Oct. 26, 1949, P.L. No. 81-411, 63 Stat. 930.
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majority stated that Congress "approved the sue-and-be-sued clause...
under conditions that make it clear that the states accepting it [through their
act of participation in the compact] waived any immunity from suit which
they otherwise might have had.'"41
Justice Frankfurter (joined by Justices Harlan and Whittaker) sharply
attacked Douglas' reasoning in his dissenting opinion. He criticized the
majority for creating the distinction between the applicability of federal
versus state law in order to create a waiver of the eleventh amendment. 42
Recognizing that, in the eyes of the majority, governmental immunity had
fallen into disfavor, the dissent reasoned that this was a poor excuse for
construing a waiver of the amendment which Congress had not even con-
sidered.43 In support of this contention the dissent pointed out that over the
past hundred years neither state had ever construed the "sue-and-be-sued"
clause as rendering a public corporation liable in private suits.44 Since such
suits have been historically limited to actions involving only signatories of the
compact, 45 the dissent concluded that even if the case did pose a "federal"
question, it "does not require a federal answer by way of a blanket,
nationwide substantive doctrine where essentially local interests are at
stake. 6
The Court's decision in Petty is significant for two reasons. First, it was
the first decision to recognize that the United States Congress (in addition to
state legislatures) may condition a state's entry into a federally regulated
activity on waiver of the eleventh amendment. Second, Petty marks a
pragmatic departure from the pre-1950 Murray Postulate concerning the
statutory interpretation of waiver. Therefore, this decision reflects a willing-
ness on the Court's part to loosely construe statutory language in order to
achieve a desired result (in this case, waiver) as opposed to construing the
provision according to what Congress intended it to accomplish.
The Warren Court further exceeded the earlier "postulates" by in-
troducing a very liberal theory of "implied" waiver in Parden v. Terminal
Railroad of the Alabama State Docks Department.47 In this case, five
railroad employees brought suit against the sole owner and operator of their
railroad, the State of Alabama, under the Federal Employer's Liability Act 4s
for injuries sustained wiile working for the railway. The majority rejected
Alabama's defense of sovereign immunity for two reasons.
41. 359 U.S. at 280.
42. Id. at 285.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 288.
45. See Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951).
46. 359 U.S. at 285.
47. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
48. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of April 22, 1908, ch. 149, § I Stat.
65) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the FELA].
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First, the Court concluded that the FELA, which authorized private
actions against employers in federal courts, applied to state as well as private
employers.4 9 Justice Brennan pointed out that the Act's language defined the
appropriate class of potential defendants (or employers) in terms of "every. "
Therefore, it could be implied that Congress intended to include the states as
part of that class. Notably, the Court adopted this interpretation even though
the Act's legislative history made no mention of whether Congress intended
the states to be a part of that class of "employers."
50
Second, the Court expanded upon Justice Douglas' "federal law"
concept in Petty and developed a new, constitutional theory of waiver. This
theory asserted that when the states "empower[ed] Congress to regulate
commerce [by ratifying the Constitution], then, the States necessarily surren-
dered any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such
regulation.' "5 In declaring this new theory of waiver though, the Court
realized that this statement seemed to waive a state's eleventh amendment
protection upon mere participation in a federal program.52 Thus, the Court
qualified this exceedingly broad language by adding that "[r]ecognition of
the congressional power to render a State suable under the FELA does not
mean that the immunity doctrine, as embodied in the Eleventh Amendment
is here being overridden."
53
Justice White, in his dissenting opinion, criticized the majority for
irresponsibly neglecting settled rules of statutory construction contrary to the
conventional Murray Postulate. In doing so, he noted that since no state was
operating a common carrier railroad when the FELA was enacted, it was
therefore impossible to determine whether Congress contemplated potential
state liability.' 4 Although the FELA's legislative history does indicate that
Congress intended to remove certain common law defenses available to
private railroad employers at that time, he noted that the states' sovereign
immunity was not one of them. 55 In conclusion, he asserted that the majority's
implied waiver theory proposes that the "waiver of a constitutional privilege
need be neither knowing nor intelligent.' '56
49. The FELA provision in question reads as follows: "Every common carrier by railroad
while engaging in commerce between any of the several States. . .shall be liable in damages to
any person suffering injury while he is employed by such common carrier. ... (Emphasis
added.) 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970).
50. See notes 54-56 and accompanying text infra.
51. 377 U.S. at 192. Justice White, in his dissenting opinion, argued that "it should not be
easily inferred that Congress, in legislating pursuant to one article of the Constitution, intended to
effect an automatic and compulsory waiver of rights arising under another." Id. at 198 (emphasis
added).
52. Cullison, supra note 9, at 33.
53. 377 U.S. at 192.
54. Id. at 199.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 200.
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Thus, the majority set forth a two-part test in Parden for determining
whether a waiver of sovereign immunity can be implied. To satisfy the test it
had to be shown that: (1) the state was participating in the federally regulated
activity in question; and (2) the activity's enabling act contained language
creating a private cause of action against a class from which it could be
implied that the state was part of that class.
In Parden, as in Petty, the Court ignored the Murray Postulate which
requires stricter-and clearer statutory construction. Parden demonstrated that
the Court was willing to imply a waiver in order to achieve uniform
application of the FELA even in the absence of enabling language in the
legislative history of the FELA. The Court justified this action on the policy
argument that "exemption from suit for state-owned railroads [under this
federal act] would leave the railroads' employees with a right to a recovery for
their injuries but no method for enforcing this right." 57 Parden marks the first
time that public policy considerations were utilized, albeit in a limited sense,
to add credibility to implying a waiver.
The Parden decision remained undisturbed until the Burger Court,
almost ten years later, considered the Parden test in Employees of the
Department of Public Health & Welfare v. Missouri Department of Public
Health & Welfare. 58 That case involved an action brought against the State of
Missouri by various employees of state schools and hospitals under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.59 Specifically, these state employees sought payment
for overtime compensation due to them pursuant to the 1966 FLSA amend-
ments 60 which subsequently brought state schools and hospitals under the
FLSA. In Employees, the Court upheld Missouri's eleventh amendment
defense, concluding that the FLSA did not specifically provide for private
suits against the states. 61 While the majority conceded that the 1966 amend-
ments brought these state-operated schools and hospitals under the FLSA, it
maintained that the particular statutory language 62 and intent 63 which au-
thorized private suits against employers did not apply to the states.
57. Id. at 197.
58. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 676§ 1-19, 52
Stat. 1060) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the FLSA].
60. 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1948), as amended by FLSA Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601,
§ 102, 80 Stat. 830.
61. 411 U.S. at 281-87.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1948) originally defined "employer" as to exclude "the United
States or any State or political subdivision of a State." However, the 1966 amendments added the
language: "except with respect to employees of a State, or a political subdivision thereof,
employed (1) in a hospital, institution, or school referred to in the last sentence of subsection (r) of
this section .... " Section 203(r) was amended at the same time to include such schools and
hospitals. See note 60 supra.
63. The legislative intent of the Act's penalty provision (which remained unchanged both
before and after 1966) was expressed accordingly:
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The Court arrived at this decision by distinguishing Employees from
both parts of the Parden test. First, the Burger Court rejected the Parden
test's proposition that it can be implied that Congress intended the states to be
part of that class which could be sued as "employers"64 under section 16(b)
simply because the 1966 amendments included these state entities under the
FLSA. The majority asserted that if Congress had intended to include the
states under the specific provision which authorized private actions in federal
courts, it should have amended that particular provision directly. 65 Further,
the Court noted that the FLSA provided an alternate legal avenue 66 for such
state employees through the office of the Secretary of Labor under section
17(c). Thus, "[s]ections 16 and 17 suggest that since private enforcement of
the Act was not a paramount objective, disallowance of suits by state
employees and remitting them to relief through the Secretary of Labor may
explain why Congress was silent as to waiver of sovereign immunity of the
States.' '67
The Court disregarded the other Parden test assumption that by par-
ticipating in a federally regulated program a state consents to private suits in
federal courts for ensuing violations. 68 The majority pointed out that this
conclusion failed to distinguish between the two significantly different policy
considerations at stake in Employees and Parden. Namely, the Court
distinguished between the financial capability of a state treasury to pay
damages owed to many plaintiffs under a governmental service program like
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7 of this Act shall be
liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum
wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional
equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover such liability may be maintained in
any court of competent jurisdiction ...
S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 22-23 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 1366, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
3, 11-12, 15-18 (1970).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970) [hereinafter referred to in the text as 16(b)] allows employees
to sue their employers in federal court for FLSA violations. Justice Marshall, in his concurring
opinion, vehemently criticized the majority's statutory interpretation here. In doing so, he
asserted:
I find it impossible to believe that Congress did not intend to extend the full benefit of
the provisions of the FLSA to these state employees. It is true . . . that . . .Congress
did not amend § [2116(b) [to clarify whether 'state' and 'employer' were to be
synonymous under this provision]. . . . [T]he alteration of the definition of employer
in § [2013(d) clearly sufficed to achieve Congress' purpose . . . . [The majority's
interpretation] ignores the basic canon of statutory construction that different provisions of
the same statute should be construed consistently with one another.
411 U.S. at 289-90.
65. 411 U.S. at 285.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 217(c) (1970) [hereinafter cited as 17(c)] "gives the Secretary [of Labor]
power to seek to enjoin violations of the Act and to obtain restitution in behalf of employees" for
unpaid wages and overtime compensation. 411 U.S. at 286.
67. 411 U.S. at 286. This reasoning is inconsistent. If, as Justice Douglas argues, Congress
must state whether 16(b) specifically applies to the states as "employers," then it is only logical
that Congress must also specify that 17(c) applies to actions brought by the Secretary on behalf of
state employees as "employees" under 17(c).
68. 411 U.S. at 285.
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a state hospital as opposed to covering the damages of only a few while
operating a proprietary, revenue-producing enterprise like a state-owned
railway,69 In addition, the majority noted that while the FELA in Parden
provided that only restitutionary relief be paid, the FLSA in Employees
permitted recovery for not only the amount of unpaid wages but liquidated
damages and attorneys' fees as well.
70
The Burger Court failed to set forth a specific test for construing a
statutory waiver. In distinguishing Parden, however, the Court demonstrated
that when a statute was unclear as to whether the defendant-class included the
states, it would not be as willing as the Warren Court to construe a waiver
based upon loose statutory construction and participation in the federally
regulated activity. In the absence of a clear congressional mandate, the
Burger Court demonstrated that it would consider the prevailing policy
implications in an effort to achieve credibility in its statutory construction of
such vague statutes. Specifically, the policy considerations examined by the
Court involved the distinctions between: (1) A state's financial ability to
cover damages emanating from governmental versus proprietary programs;
(2) forcing states to pay restitutionary relief versus restitutionary relief plus
liquidated damages and attorneys' fees; and (3) the availability of legal
recourse through a federal agency versus the availability of no legal recourse
at all. It is important to note that in response to the Supreme Court's decision
in Employees, Congress amended 16(b) of the FLSA to clarify that it did
intend this subsection to constitute a waiver of state immunity; thus making
the states amenable to private actions in federal courts for violations under the
FLSA.
7 1
The Burger Court considered the issue again in Edelman v. Jordan .72 In
that case, an eligible welfare recipient brought an action against the State of
Illinois for failure to process his application and issue payments under the Aid
to the Aged, Blind and Disabled program. 73 The AABD is a joint, federal-
state program wherein the federal government provides funding assistance to
the states to conduct such programs under the Social Security Act.7a At the
time of the suit, the federal regulations for AABD programs provided that
decisions on applications for assistance were to be made within 30 days for the
aged and blind and 45 days for the disabled and required that payments to
69. Id. at 284. Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion, urged the Court to take further
notice of the fact that, in Parden, Alabama entered into its proprietary endeavor about twenty
years after the FELA had been enacted; whereas, in Employees, Missouri was operating various
state schools and hospitals (a compelling governmental service) well before the 1966 amend-
ments. 411 U.S. at 296.
70. 411 U.S. at 286.
71. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. 1975).
72. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 3-1-3-12 (1973) [hereinafter referred to in the text as AABD].
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (1970).
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eligible recipients were to begin within those time limits. 75 Illinois failed to
approve Jordan's application for almost four months after the submission of
his application. The plaintiff brought a class action in the district court
alleging jurisdiction under section 1983 of the Social Security Act.76 Indoing
so, the plaintiff petitioned the court for two forms of relief: (1) an injunction
requiring the state to process applications and expedite payments in accord-
ance with the HEW regulations; and (2) "equitable restitution' '--or payment
of all prior aid checks not paid during that period in which a recipient would
have received assistance had his application been processed on time.
77
Notably, "equitable restitution" was distinguished from retroactive dam-
ages. It was asserted that since the payments in question would have been
available had the applications been filed properly, "the nature of the impact
on the state treasury is precisely the same.' 8 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court which granted both
forms of relief. 79 While the United States Supreme Court upheld the validity
of the injunction, it reversed the lower court's grant of "equitable
restitution. "80
In support of its decision, the Court relied on Ex parte Young.8' That
case established that the federal courts are empowered to issue injunctions
which order state public officials to comply "prospectively" with a federal
law in the future.8 2 By denying the petition for "equitable restitution," the
Court rejected the theory adopted by the court of appeals which asserted that
Ex parte Young allowed all actions against the states which are "equita-
ble" in nature.8 3 In doing so, the Court noted that:
[tihis argument neglects the fact that where the State has a defin-
able allocation to be used in the payment of public aid benefits, and
pursues a certain course of action such as the processing of
applications within certain time periods as did Illinois here, the
subsequent ordering by a federal court of retroactive payments to
correct delays in such processing will invariably mean there is less o
money available for payments for the continuing obligations of the
public aid system.8
Thus, the Court concluded that a judgment in favor of "equitable re-
stitution"---or retroactive relief-would be contrary to the purpose of the
eleventh amendment which is to protect the states against the disruption of
their treasuries. 85 The Court then noted that such retroactive relief would only
75. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(3) (1972).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
77. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 987 n.3 (7th Cir. 1973).
78. 415 U.S. at 682.
79. 472 F.2d at 999.
80. 415 U.S. at 669.
81. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
82. Id. at 155-56.
83. 415 U.S. at 666.
84. Id. at n.11.
85. Id. at 668. See, Nowak, supra note 13, at 1420-21.
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be warranted if it could be established that there was a statutory waiver of
Illinois' eleventh amendment protection. In concluding that there was no
waiver of state immunity, the majority once again distinguished the dual
Parden test.
First, the Court noted that unlike Parden and Employees, Edelman
involved a statute which provided for no private actions against a class of
defendants from which it could be inferred as including the states. 86 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, explained that while the applicable
statute did impose federal sanctions upon a state for noncompliance, such
sanctions were limited to the termination of future allocations of federal
matching funds. He also distinguished Petty, Parden and Employees by
observing that "the threshold fact of congressional authorization to sue a class
of defendants which literally includes States is wholly absent" 87 in Edelman.
Second, the Burger Court rejected the applicability of the Parden test's
theory of consent to waiver through participation-referred to in Edelman as
''constructive consent. "8 In denouncing this theory, Justice Rehnquist
argued:
Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with
the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it
here. . . .The mere fact that a State participates in a program
through which the Federal Government provides assistance. . . is
not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be sued
in the federal courts.89
Thus, it is clear that the Burger Court in Employees and Edelman
smothered the trend toward the liberal interpretation of waiver advanced by
the Warren Court in Petty and Parden. The Burger Court's purpose for doing
so was evident. It viewed the purpose of the eleventh amendment as designed
to prevent the courts from disrupting state treasuries. To reinstate this
purpose, however, the Burger Court whittled away at the Parden test instead
of carving out a new doctrine of waiver. Indeed, the policy considerations
introduced in Employees and Edelman are relevant but the Court failed to
mold them into a workable formula. Thus, it has become the lower courts'
task to reformulate a new test along the lines of the Burger Court's criticism of
the Parden test.
THE SEVENTH -CIRCUIT TEST FOR DETERMINING
STATUTORY WAIVER
Williamson Towing Co. v. Illinois9° was the first case regarding the
86. Id. at 671-74.
87. Id. at 672.
88. Id. at f73.
89. Id.
90. 534 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1976).
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statutory waiver of state immunity that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit considered after the Burger Court handed down its decision in
Edelman. In that case, the plaintiff sought restitutionary relief for damages
sustained by certain barges being towed by its tugboat resulting from a
nighttime collision with a pier of the Upper Cairo Highway Bridge on the
Mississippi River.91 The facts showed that Illinois negligently failed to
maintain proper lights and signals on the bridge at the time of the collision.
While the bridge was owned and operated by Missouri and Illinois jointly, the
collision took place on the Illinois side of the bridge.
Both the district court and the court of appeals upheld Illinois' eleventh
amendment defense, thus barring recovery.92 In doing so, the court rejected
the plaintiff's contention that the Cairo Bridge Act Amendments of 193893
and the Bridge Act of 190694 contained language providing for a waiver of
Illinois' eleventh amendment protection. The court considered the following
theories of statutory construction in reaching its decision.
The opinion pointed out that the Cairo Bridge Act Amendments au-
thorized the Cairo Bridge Commission95 to purchase and maintain the bridge
involved in this case. 96 Those amendments further authorized the Commis-
sion to convey the respective portions of the new bridge to the states of Illinois
and Missouri after suitable financial arrangements had been made. In 1954,
the Commission conveyed to Illinois that part of the bridge adjacent to the
State of Illinois by warranty deed. The plaintiff argued that the enabling act
contained a sue-and-be-sued clause similar to the one contained in the
Tennessee-Missouri bridge compact in Petty. However, the court concluded
that a careful reading of the Cairo Bridge Act revealed that the sue-and-be-
sued clause referred "only to the Commission and not to its successors and
assigns. "
9 7
The Bridge Act of 1906 prohibits the construction or operation of a
91. Judge Tone noted in his opinion that procedurally:
Williamson [Towing Co.] filed . .. [its original] action in admiralty in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi pursuant to the Limitation
of Vessel Owner's Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 181, et seq., seeking exoneration from, or
limitation of, liability for all claims arising out of the collision. Shortly thereafter, the
Alter Company, owner of the barges and bailee of the cargo, filed a claim against
Williamson to recover for damage suffered by the barges and the cargo. On Williamson's
motion, the case was transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the Eastern District
of Illinois so the State of Illinois could be impleaded. Williamson then filed a
third-party complaint against the state, alleging negligence in failing to have the
bridge's navigation lights turned on. From the District Court's dismissal of the
third-party complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction under the Eleventh
Amendment, Williamson took this appeal.
534 F.2d at 759.
92. Id. at 758.
93. Act of June 14, 1938, P.L. No. 75-601, 52 Stat. 679.
94. 33 U.S.C. §§ 491-497 (1970).
95. Hereinafter referred to in the text as the Commission.
96. Act of Apr. 13, 1934, P.L. No. 73-156, 48 Stat. 577, § 8.
97. 534 F.2d at 761.
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bridge in such a manner as would unreasonably obstruct "the free navigation
of the waters over which it is constructed.' 98 In relevant part, the Act requires
the owner of a bridge to maintain "such lights and other signals thereon as the
Commandant of the Coast Guard shall prescribe." 99 If the owner fails to
comply, the Secretary of the Army is authorized to either initiate an action
under the direction of the Attorney General to enjoin non-conforming
behavior or to remove the bridge and sue its owner for the cost of removal. 100
Under these penalty provisions the court emphasized that the "Act . . . 'is
penal in nature and enforcement of its provisions is vested in the Attorney
General.' "101 In other words, the court concluded that the Act does not go so
far as to create a private action against the states. In reaching this conclusion,
Judge Tone reasoned that:
There is no doubt that the state, as owner and operator of the
bridge, is under a duty to operate and maintain it properly. To say
this is not, however, to answer the question of whether the state has
waived its immunity from private suit. There is no more reason to
infer a waiver of immunity or an intent to create a private right of
action against the state from the 1938 Cairo Bridge Act than from
the Bridge Act of 1906.102
The statutory construction of the Bridge Act adopted by the Seventh
Circuit concurs with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the same statute in
Intracoastal Transportation, Inc. v. Decatur County.10 3 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit rejected sub silencio the more liberal construction advanced by the
dissent in Intracoastal. Specifically, the dissent's more liberal reading
asserted that:
The paramount purposes behind the Act demand that the states,
who typically own the bridges involved, be made amenable to suits
for enforcement of the statutory standards. This is true regardless
[of] whether the plaintiff is the United States or a private party
injured by the violation of a statutory provision designed to protect
him. Thus, there is no reason to presume that Congress did not
intend to lift the states' immunity in all cases [arising under the
Bridge Act]. °
In essence, this liberal theory would construe a waiver based upon an
"implied purpose" which is read into the statute. This liberal theory,
98. 33 U.S.C. § 494 (1970).
99. Id.
100. 33 U.S.C. § 495 (1970).
101. 534 F.2d at 762, (quoting from 482 F.2d at 366).
102. Id. at 762 n.4 (emphasis added).
103. 482 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1973); cf. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. Department of
Transp. of N.J., 432 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1970), and Bass Angler Sportsman Soc. v. United States
Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (consolidated), aff'd percuriam, 447 F.2d 1304
(5th Cir. 1971) (Both the above mentioned cases hold that the penalty provision under the
Rivers & Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 406, is penal in nature and does not
grant enforcement powers to private parties.)
104. 482 F.2d at 370.
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however, constitutes an incorrect reading of the statutory language in ques-
tion and the Seventh Circuit's interpretation represents the more accurate
view.
In Williamson, Judge Tone's use of the word "infer, 0 5 in concluding
that neither act contains a statutory basis on which waiver can be implied,
would appear to suggest that the Seventh Circuit still acknowledges the
existence of a theory of implied waiver. Yet, the majority opinion's interpre-
tation of the relevant Supreme Court cases appears to sound the death knell for
implied waiver. This was evidenced by the court's adoption of the statutory
waiver test developed by the Fifth Circuit in Intracoastal.106 Specifically,
Intracoastal concluded that Employees added an additional requirement to
the Parden test when it asserted that:
It is no longer sufficient merely to show that a State has entered a
federally regulated sphere of activity and that a private cause of
action is created for violating the applicable federal provision, but
in addition the private litigant must show that Congress expressly
provided that the private remedy is applicable to the States.
0 7
In adopting the Fifth Circuit's test, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged
that "it would be arbitrary to infer a waiver by consent 'to civil liability that
could not be anticipated by reading the relevant statute.' ''108 The court
further asserted that since the Bridge Act "created no new remedy other than
penal sanctions, . . . it is illogical to imply that Congress intended that a
violation by the State should give rise to a civil claim for damages." ' 109 In
doing so, the court distinguished the similar statutory circumstances in Petty,
Parden, and Employees, and noted that the Bridge Act in Williamson (like
the Social Security Act in Edelman) did not involve a "congressional
enactment which by its terms authorized suit by designated plaintiffs against a
general class of defendants which literally included States."'
110
It should be further noted that neither the Seventh Circuit in Williamson
nor the Fifth Circuit in Intracoastal made any attempt to incorporate the
policy considerations enunciated in Employees into their waiver test. The
Fifth Circuit simply mentioned some of the policies in an historical context.
The Seventh Circuit, in a footnote, singled out the governmental service
versus proprietary distinction and noted that the operation of a non-toll bridge
in Williamson would fall into the non-proprietary category. 11 However, like
105. See note 102 and accompanying text supra.
106. 534 F.2d at 762.
107. 482 F.2d at 365.
108. 534 F.2d at 761-62, (quoting from Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. Department of
Transp. of N.J., 432 F.2d 104, 106 (3d Cir. 1970) ). It should be noted that this argument had been
raised by Justice White in his dissenting opinion in Parden; however, the majority chose to ignore
it. See notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra.
109. 423 F.2d at 106.
110. 534 F.2d at 762, (quoting from 415 U.S. at 672) (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 761 n.3.
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the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit ignored referring to the policy consider-
ations when setting forth its test.
ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT TEST
The Seventh Circuit test provides the courts with no more a workable
formula to construe statutory waivers than the pre- 1950 Murray Postulate. 112
Like the Murray Postulate, the Seventh Circuit's test ignores the fact that
Congress has enacted and will probably continue to enact legislation which
contains provisions that result in unresolved conflicts with the eleventh
amendment. Specifically, the test does not address itself to the existence of
federal enactments which provide for suits against a class which happen to
include a state but remain unclear as to whether Congress intended that the
states be included as parties of that class. For example, the FELA in Parden 13
and the FLSA in Employees'1 4 contained express statutory language which
left the Court sharply divided over whether these enactments "literally"
created a private cause of action which applied to the states. Petty, Parden,
and Employees demonstrated that when the test for interpreting a statutory
waiver required a clear expression of applicability, the liberal Warren Court
and the conservative Burger Court tended to construe statutory language
either loosely or strictly in order to achieve desired results consistent with
their respective views of the eleventh amendment. Not all statutes are like
section 1983 of the Social Security Act in Edelman or the Bridge Act of 1906
in Williamson. These statutes contain no statutory language which provides
for private actions against any class.
The Seventh Circuit's extreme emphasis on a showing of express
statutory waiver is misplaced. While the Burger Court failed to compose a
comprehensible test, the Court's opinion in Employees indicated that when
there exists a legitimate, statutory dispute over whether Congress included the
states as part of an act's defendant class, the process of construing a waiver
should not terminate at the statutory construction stage. The Court demon-
strated that a waiver should not be granted until serious consideration has been
given to the policy implications as well as the statutory expressions.
The Seventh Circuit did not specify that the application of its test should
be limited in any way. Thus, it must be concluded that the court intended its
test to be applied to all statutory situations involving the problem of
construing a waiver. This means that, if confronted with a statute which
expressly provides for private remedies against a class but remains ambiguous
as to whether states were included as part of that class, the Seventh Circuit test
112. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
113. See notes 47-57 and accompanying text supra.
114. See notes 58-70 and accompanying text supra.
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would require that waiver be determined primarily upon a court's semantical
interpretation of the statutory language without regard to the policy implica-
tions of its decision.
The Seventh Circuit in Williamson failed to explain why it did not
incorporate policy into its test. In the absence of such an explanation, the
court: (1) erred in failing to distinguish the applicability of its test to those
federal statutes which do not authorize ensuing private actions in federal
courts from those that do, but remain unclear as to whether they apply to the
states; and (2) overlooked the importance that the Supreme Court cases placed
on the role which policy should play in determining whether a waiver should
be construed under the latter kind of statute.
PROPOSALS: CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AND A COMPREHENSIVE
TEST FOR IMPLIED WAIVER
When a statute either explicitly authorizes or flatly denies private suits
against the states, the supremacy clause t 15 requires that the courts enforce the
act in accordance with Congress' will as manifested in the language of the
enactment. However, to remedy the problem of determining whether a waiver
exists under statutes which remain ambiguous, the following recommenda-
tions are offered as possible solutions. The most effective approach, in the
long term, would be for Congress to pass a concurrent resolution that would
require all its enactments which create private actions in federal courts to
contain a State Immunity Impact Statement. Such a statement would require
Congress to specify (briefly) whether or not it intended the states to be part of
the statute's defendant class.
The impact statement approach has several advantages. It would im-
mediately and unambiguously alert all states as to whether their participation
in a federal activity is to be conditioned upon a waiver of their eleventh
amendment protection. In addition, courts and litigants would realize signifi-
cant savings in time and money which are normally wasted throughout the
process of statutory construction during trial and appeal. Moreover, it would
ensure the uniform application of waiver under all statutes containing the
statement.
The impact statement approach is not without problems however. Even
if Congress were to adopt such a legislative requirement, it would affect only
those statutues enacted, extended or reauthorized in the future. Thus, many
existing statutes containing unresolved conflicts with the eleventh amend-
ment would remain without such congressional clarification.
115. The supremacy clause specifies that: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby .... " U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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In the absence of congressional clarification, the following test is offered
as a tool designed to aid the courts in determining whether an implied waiver
should be granted under ambiguous statutes. 116 Specifically, the proposed test
would require the courts to proceed in their statutory determinations accord-
ing to the following two-step analysis.
First, the plainitff would be entitled to seek an implied waiver under an
ambiguous statute only if he could initially show convincing proof that: (a)
the statute in question contains language which literally authorizes that
designated plaintiffs, such as the plaintiff at bar, may institute private actions
against a class; and (b) the relevant statutory language can be reasonably read
as to include the states as members of that provision's defendant-class.
Relevant legislative history and federal court interpretation could be con-
sidered to aid the courts in its statutory construction.
Second, if this reasonable inference is established, the court would then
be justified in granting an implied waiver only after a showing that judgments
in favor of all reasonably foreseeable plaintiffs under the statute would have a
minimal fiscal impact on state treasuries.
To determine the extent of fiscal impact, the courts would have to look
beyond the injury of the plaintiff in the case at bar to all reasonably
foreseeable designated plaintiffs under the ambiguous statute. In doing so, the
courts must consider the following interdependent factors.
First, larger programs involving pervasive, state-wide governmental
activities must be distinguished from non-pervasive or local ones. Specifical-
ly, the courts must consider whether the reasonably foreseeable class of
designated plaintiffs under the statute is affordably small or unaffordably
large relative to the nature of potential injuries and the frequency with which
they may occur.
Second, and most importantly, the courts must make a responsible fiscal
impact analysis of all potential remedies applicable to the states. Edelman
demonstrated that prospective remedies, which are used to enforce valid
federal statutes are consistent with the history and purpose of the eleventh
amendment. Moreover, while Employees demonstrated that the courts should
exercise extreme caution before imposing retroactive penalties on the states,
it remains unclear whether the foreclosure of retroactive relief in Edelman
applied to ambiguous statutes. Pursuant to these cases, the courts should
adhere to the following general rules: (a) the closer a federally regulated, state
entity comes to being a purely governmental service activity, the more a court
should refrain from imposing a fiscal burden upon the state; and (b) the courts
should further refrain from imposing retroactive damages when a state has not
116. Other implied waiver tests have been proposed in Intracoastal Transp., Inc. v.
Decatur County, 482 F.2d at 369-70 (Wisdom, J., dissenting); Nowak, supra note 13, at 1446-50.
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made appropriate financial arrangements to cover itself against such
liabilities. In other words, the courts should give careful consideration as to
whether a decision in favor of a waiver would force the state "to appropriate
additional funds to pay for liabilities incurred in prior fiscal years when it was
unaware of the need for such an allocation." ' In doing so, revenue
spending, governmental service programs like the Missouri Department of
Health, Education and Welfare in Employees must be distinguished from
revenue-producing enterprises like the state-operated railroad in Parden. The
courts should note whether a state enterprise had previously entered into
financial arrangements, such as insurance coverage, either voluntarily or in
response to the statute in order to compensate such injured plaintiffs.
However, the courts must also take into account whether such state enter-
prises maintained sufficient enough financial arrangements to compensate
without the aid of unanticipated appropriations or excessive cross subsidies
resulting in a more than minimal fiscal drain. Similarly, the courts should
consider whether the revenue-spending service program was such that it
maintained coverage sufficient to compensate.
The primary function of the fiscal impact requirement is to serve as a
check against the improper construction of waivers under ambiguous statutes.
In addition to considering fiscal impact factors, the courts are encouraged to
consider the underlying federal policy factors (involved in subjecting the
states to federal causes of action under regulatory statutes) as reflected in the
statute's legislative history. However, the fiscal impact requirement should
not be interpreted as empowering the courts to balance such federal policy
considerations against the fiscal interests of the states. 118 To do so would
allow the courts to read their own conceptions of public policy into the statute.
As a result, the courts could conceivably construe statutes in light of their own
view of federal policy instead of in accordance with the purpose of the
eleventh amendment.
The history of the eleventh amendment has shown that the courts are
competent to make responsible determinations of fiscal impact on the
states.119 It is unlikely that the courts will come across many ambiguous
statutes which would result in a substantial dispute as to whether the economic
arrangements are such that the state could retroactively afford all reasonably
foreseeable claims. This is not to say, however, that such a dispute could arise
depending upon the economic assumptions considered under certain statutes.
In such cases, it would be up to the United States Supreme Court, on appeal,
to advance that determination of fiscal impact or waiver which is most
117. Nowak, note 13 supra, at 1444.
118. Contra, id. at 1447.
119. See notes 31-89 and accompanying text supra.
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consistent with the eleventh amendment until Congress should see fit to
clarify.
The modus operandi of the proposed test would be as follows. The
plaintiff could seek an implied waiver under an ambiguous statute by proving
up the specific statutory inference set forth in the first part of the test. Proof of
the necessary statutory inference must be established as a condition precedent
before the court could then evaluate whether such an implied waiver of the
statute would result in a more than minimal fiscal impact on the states. If the
court determines, after a thorough examination, that a waiver of the statute as
a whole would in fact result in only a minimal fiscal impact on the states, then,
and only then, would the court be justified in implying a waiver.
Applying the proposed test to Williamson, the Bridge Act of 1906
contains no statutory language which authorizes private actions to be brought
in federal courts against any class. On its face, the statute does not grant a
waiver. If the plaintiff were to attempt to challenge the statute by showing the
requisite statutory inference of the first part of the test, he would fail because
the statute does not contain language providing for private actions against a
class which could realistically be interpreted as including the states--or any
party for that matter. Failure to satisfy the statutory inference requirement
afforded the plaintiff no basis upon which to claim eligibility for a court
determination of fiscal impact and thus an implied waiver. Since the Bridge
Act provided no basis on which to grant either an express or an implied
waiver, Illinois' defense of sovereign immunity prevails.
The Seventh Circuit's test and the proposal test can be distinguished
according to their respective capabilities to ensure uniform determinations of
waiver which are consistent with the purpose of the eleventh amendment. The
Seventh Circuit's test requires a showing of statutory language which
''expressly provided that the private remedy is applicable to the States. "120
The problem remains, however, that most ambiguous statutes usually contain
express language that seemingly creates a private remedy "applicable" to the
states. And the history of federal court decisions has shown that what may
constitute a clear expression of applicability to a liberal court may be read as a
clear expression of non-applicability to a more conservative court. 2 Without
more, a test which requires only a showing of express applicability is
inadequate to insure uniformity. In addition, the Seventh Circuit's test turns
solely on statutory construction without regard to the fiscal impact on the
120. 534 F.2d at 762, (quoting from 482 F.2d at 365).
121. Cf. Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel Dist. v. Lauritzen, 404 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.
1968), and Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. Department of Transp. of N.J., 432 F.2d 104 (3d
Cir. 1970) (The Fourth and Third Circuits arrive at different statutory determinations as to
whether the penalty provision under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act, 33 U.S.C. §406
(1899), should be read as waiving the states' eleventh amendment protection.)
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states. Thus, there is always the possibility that waivers granted on statutory
construction alone could impose enormous fiscal burdens on the states which
would be inconsistent with the purpose of the eleventh amendment.
The proposed test is better equipped to ensure uniformity and consisten-
cy. It requires a court to make certain that a waiver would not disrupt state
treasuries before it could justify construing a waiver based on ambiguous
statutory language. As a result, requiring the courts to make comprehensive
fiscal impact determinations in addition to considering statutory construction
and legislative history should facilitate more uniform determinations of
waiver under the same statute. Also, this requirement would compel a court to
consider its statutory construction in terms of whether it is consistent with the
purpose of the eleventh amendment.
It is to be expected that some critics may find this proposed test too literal
while others may assail it as a mechanism which would faciliate judicial
encroachment upon the Congress' legislative authority. It should be noted,
however, that "the supreme function of the judge [and the courts] is to
recognize that there must be limits, both ways, avoiding undue literalism on
the one hand, and too wide a freedom of action on the other."
'1 22
It is submitted that the proposed test offers a workable balance between
literalism and excessive judicial freedom. The test contains a check against
judicial excess by requiring a showing that, under ambiguous statutes, a
legitimate statutory basis exists first, before the court could consider (or
manipulate) the fiscal policy implications to imply a waiver. Where no
statutory basis can be realistically established, as in Williamson, the courts
must respect the supremacy of the federal law over ensuing policy considera-
tions. If, on the other hand, the requisite statutory basis exists, consideration
of the fiscal policy factors as well as the statute's legislative history prior to
implying a waiver has two advantages. First, it demands consideration of vital
state interests as well as the interests of the injured individual. This exercise
will ensure carefully considered determinations of waiver as opposed to those
based purely on semantics. Second, congressional response to the Court's
interepretation of the FLSA in Employees shows that federal court considera-
tion of the policies underlying such vague statutes can generate publicity
substantial enough to attract the scrutiny of the Congress, thus encouraging
specific congressional clarification when necessary.'
1 23
CONCLUSION
The Seventh and Fifth Circuits advanced a test for the statutory waiver of
state immunity which requires an express showing that Congress literally
122. Griswold, The Judicial Process, 31 FED. B.J. 309, 319 (1972) (footnote omitted).
123. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
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provided for private actions to be brought against the states in federal courts.
In setting forth this test, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that it embodied the
rulings in Employees and Edelman. However, the Seventh Circuit did not
fully incorporate the rulings of those decisions in its test and, for that reason,
its test is defective. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit limited the scope of its
test to apply to only those statutes where the existence of a waiver is clear on
its face. Thus, it is inadequate to treat those ambiguous statutes which create
private actions against a class yet remain unclear as to whether they apply to
the states. In failing to make this distinction, it can only be inferred that the
Seventh Circuit intended that its test (requiring only strict construction) to
apply to both types of statutes. However, the Burger Court demonstrated in
Employees that when a court is confronted with an ambiguous statutory
situation, the process of construing a waiver should not be concluded upon
semantical interpretation alone. The Court emphasized that policy as well as
statutory construction should be considered.
This article proposes a test for the courts to employ when construing a
waiver under statutes which remain unclear as to whether they apply to the
states. The proposed test requires the injured plaintiff to show convincing
proof that the ambiguous statute in question provides for private suits against
a class from which it could be reasonably inferred as to include the states.
Upon establishing this premise, the court would then be justified in determin-
ing that the statute intended a waiver provided that judgments in favor of all
reasonably foreseeable plaintiffs under the statute would have a minimal
fiscal impact on state treasuries. It is submitted that the proposed test of
implied waiver would facilitate just determinations of waiver on behalf of
both individuals and the states. The step-by-step approach built into the test
eases up the extent to which the courts must become preoccupied with
statutory semantics while limiting the court's ability to read its private notions
of social policy into such ambiguous congressional enactments. In doing so,
the test would faciliate uniform determinations of waiver which are consistent
with the purpose of the eleventh amendment as enunciated by the Burger
Court in Edelman and Employees.
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